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INTER-AGENCY EVIDENCE SHARING  
IN COMPETITION LAW ENFORCEMENT 
MAREK MARTYNISZYN* 
Abstract: 
While transnational antitrust enforcement is becoming only more common, the access to 
foreign-based evidence remains a considerable practical challenge. This article 
appraises considerations and concerns surrounding confidentiality, and looks into ways 
of their possible accommodation. It further identifies and critically evaluates the 
existing mechanisms allowing for inter-agency confidential information/ evidence 
sharing in competition law enforcement. The article outlines the shortcomings of the 
current framework and points to novel unilateral approaches. In the latter regard the 
focus is devoted to Australia, where the competition agency is empowered to share 
confidential information with foreign counterparts, also without any underlying bilateral 
agreement and on a non-reciprocal basis. This solution shows that a pragmatic and 
workable approach to inter-agency evidence sharing can be achieved.  
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Growing economic interconnectedness is a feature of the global business landscape.1 
Transnational commerce grows, even if at a slowed pace as compared to its 
pre-recession dynamic.2 At the same time, there is no World Competition Court. Private 
anticompetitive conduct is not regulated within any broad, multilateral framework. 
Competition laws remain predominantly national.3 Extraterritoriality is the only tool of 
general availability allowing addressing anticompetitive harm caused by foreign entities 
operating abroad.4 From this perspective the major practical challenge in enforcement—
often the crux of the matter—is the issue of accessing foreign-based evidence. 
Most antitrust proceedings outside the US are not judicial, but administrative in 
nature. This means that in transnational enforcement, rules of inter-agency cooperation 
(that is, cooperation between agencies/ authorities of different regimes enforcing 
competition rules) are of greater practical significance than the means of international 
judicial cooperation.5 That said, the majority of existing cooperation agreements do not 
allow for sharing of confidential information, or providing assistance in obtaining 
evidence,6 despite the fact that ‘accessing relevant information is the lifeblood of 
competition enforcement’.7 
                                                             
1 For detailed data on economic globalization see KOF Index of Globalization, 
<http://globalization.kof.ethz.ch/>. 
2 For some general thoughts on what type of challenges face multinational companies in the aftermath of the 
recent crisis see Ernst & Young, 'Looking Beyond the Obvious: Globalization and New Opportunities for Growth' 
(January 2013), <http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/Globalization_-
_Looking_beyond_the_obvious/$FILE/LookingBeyondObvious.pdf>. 
3 The terms antitrust and competition law are used in this article interchangeably.  
4 See generally on extraterritoriality Menno T. Kamminga, ‘Extraterritoriality’ [in:] Rüdiger Wolfrum (ed.), The 
Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law, online ed. (Oxford University Press, 2010), 
<http://www.mpepil.com/>. For the discussion in the antitrust context see, for example, Eleanor M. Fox, 'Can we 
Solve the Antitrust Problems of Globalization by Extraterritoriality and Cooperation? Sufficiency and Legitimacy', 
48(2) Antitrust Bulletin 355 (2003). 
5 Jürgen Basedow, 'Competition Policy in a Globalized Economy: from Extraterritorial Application to 
Harmonization' in Manfred Neumann and Jürgen Weigand (eds), The International Handbook of Competition 
(Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2004) 325. 
6 For the analysis of enforcement cooperation agreements see Anestis S. Papadopoulos, The International 
Dimension of EU Competition Law and Policy (Cambridge: CUP, 2010) 52-82. See further, International 
Enforcement Co-operation: Secretariat Report on the OECD/ICN Survey on International Enforcement Co-operation 
(2013), 19, 119-140, <http://www.oecd.org/competition/InternEnforcementCooperation2013.pdf>. 
7 Brendan J. Sweeney, The Internationalisation of Competition Rules (London: Routledge, 2010) 279. 
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While international cooperation in the field of antitrust is overall a success story, the 
‘worst part of the track record’8—as Judge Wood put it—is the lack of the development 
of inter-agency enforcement cooperation. This relates primarily to the very issue of 
information and evidence sharing, despite the numerous calls for greater collaboration 
in this regard.9 In fact, in the recent international enforcement cooperation survey 
conducted by the Competition Committee of the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) many competition agencies acknowledged that 
legal limits preventing them from exchanging confidential information and evidence are 
the primary impediment to international cooperation.10 
Given the limitations of the international judicial assistance and the territorial nature 
of enforcement jurisdiction under international law,11 the information sharing between 
competition authorities has an important role to play in narrowing down the existing 
enforcement gap. By enabling access to foreign-based evidence, such cooperation 
improves the effectiveness of reliance on extraterritorial application of domestic 
competition law.12 In the longer term it could lead—through trust building—to a more 
multilateral response to challenges posed by transnational anticompetitive conduct.  
This article offers an original contribution to the existing literature by identifying and 
critically evaluating the existing mechanisms allowing for inter-agency confidential 
                                                             
8 Diane P. Wood, 'Soft Harmonizing among Competition Laws: Track Record and Prospects', 48 Antitrust 
Bulletin 305 (2003), at 315-16. 
9 For example, within the OECD framework. See OECD, ‘Hard Core Cartels. Recent Progress and Challenges 
Ahead’, 44, 47 (2003). The case of merger review is somewhat different, since it is quite natural for merging parties 
to grant confidentiality waivers, allowing competition agencies to share and discus the submitted information, 
facilitating the review. For discussion of confidentiality waivers in this context and sample waivers forms see 
International Competition Network, ‘Model Confidentiality Waiver’ (2005), 
<http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc330.pdf>. 
10 International Enforcement Co-operation: Secretariat Report on the OECD/ICN Survey on International 
Enforcement Co-operation, above note 6, at 22-23. 
11 Although the practices of states vary, the conservative view holds that under international law it is permitted 
merely to notify a foreign party in a foreign state about the proceedings in the forum. No command could be 
addressed to such a party; no threat of penalties for non-compliance can be imposed. See generally Frederick 
Alexander Mann, ‘The Doctrine of Jurisdiction in International Law’, 111 Recueil des Cours 1, ch. IV (1964). 
12 Apart from that key effect, such cooperation helps to avoid contradictory outcomes and allows for more 
efficient allocation of scarce resources of agencies (by, for example, allowing to avoid duplication). This is 
particularly so when cooperating authorities investigate the same conduct. 
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information/ evidence sharing in competition law enforcement. It outlines the 
shortcomings of the current regulatory framework and points to novel unilateral 
approaches. In the latter regard the focus is devoted to Australia, where the competition 
agency is empowered to share confidential information with foreign counterparts even 
without any underlying bilateral agreement and also on a non-reciprocal basis. This 
solution shows that a pragmatic and workable approach to inter-agency evidence 
sharing can be achieved. 
Part I of this article restates and appraises considerations and concerns surrounding 
confidentiality, both in general and specifically from a competition law perspective. It 
also explores ways of their possible accommodation. Part II offers an overview of rules 
on confidentiality applicable to antitrust enforcement in the EU and in the US—two 
most influential competition law regimes. Part III identifies and evaluates the existing 
international (bilateral and plurilateral) and domestic instruments enabling sharing of 
confidential information between antitrust agencies. The conclusions call for following 
the Australian unilateral good practice—enabling, but not requiring, domestic agencies 
to share confidential information with foreign counterparts on a case-by-case basis and 
subject to necessary and appropriate safeguards. 
I.  CONSIDERATIONS SURROUNDING CONFIDENTIALITY AND 
EVIDENCE SHARING 
The laws guarding confidentiality remain a considerable obstacle in furthering inter-
agency cooperation in competition law enforcement. There are various, often important, 
reasons why certain types of information should be kept confidential. This part 
5 
identifies the most commonly voiced concerns against inter-agency cooperation in this 
regard, looks into their validity and possible ways of their accommodation.13 
Firstly, it is often argued that the need to protect business secrets, 
commercially/business sensitive information requires stringent rules on confidentiality. 
Business plans and strategies are of paramount importance from a firm’s perspective. 
Exchanges between agencies may lead to information being ‘leaked’ to companies in 
foreign jurisdictions for their benefit.14 In response to this argument the US Department 
of Justice (DoJ) invited the business community to identify a case in which confidential 
business information shared between competition authorities has been misused or 
leaked to foreign competitors. So far no example has been identified.15 
Secondly, it is claimed that exchange of evidence between authorities could 
undermine leniency programmes. Many antitrust agencies introduced programmes 
which allow cartel members, especially whistleblowers, to benefit either from full or 
partial immunity16 in exchange for reporting prohibited conduct and helping the agency 
investigate it.17 Apart from the effects in particular cases, leniency programmes are a 
significant factor in destabilizing cartels and deterring their formation. In the context of 
inter-agency information sharing the argument is that such exchanges may lead to the 
                                                             
13 Compare Michelle Chowdhury, ‘From Paper Promises to Concrete Commitments: Dismantling The Obstacles 
to Transatlantic Cooperation in Cartel Enforcement’, 13-20 (AAI Working Paper No. 11-09, 2011), 
<http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/~antitrust/sites/default/files/working_paper_11-09.pdf>; Sweeney, above note 7, at 
300-04; Bruno Zanettin, Cooperation Between Antitrust Agencies at the International Level (Oxford: Hart 
Publishing, 2002) 131-45. 
14 Sweeney, above note 7, at 302-04. 
15 Scott D. Hammond, Dispelling the Myths Surrounding Information Sharing, 6 (The ICN Cartels Workshop, 
Sydney 2004), <http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/206610.pdf>. 
16 In some regimes, for example in the South Korea, Hungary and in the UK, a whistleblower may also benefit 
from a qui tam reward (a cartel ‘bounty’). See D. Daniel Sokol, 'Detection and Compliance in Cartel Policy', 8(2) CPI 
Antitrust Chronicle (2011), <http://ssrn.com/paper=1935907>; Kevin R. Sullivan, et al., 'The Potential Impact of 
Adding a Whistleblower Rewards Provision to ACPERA', (10) Antitrust Source 1 (2011), 
<http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/antitrust_source/oct11_sullivan_10_24f.authcheckdam.pdf
>. Compare the UK’s Office of Fair Trading online information on such rewards 
<http://www.oft.gov.uk/OFTwork/competition-act-and-cartels/cartels/rewards>. 
17 For example, under the EU leniency scheme an applicant may in certain circumstances benefit from full 
immunity from a fine. Commission Notice on Immunity from fines and reduction of fines in cartel cases, OJ C 298, 
11-22 (2006), paras 8-13. On the EU and the US leniency programmes see Nicolo Zingales, 'European and American 
Leniency Programmes: Two Models Towards Convergence?', 5(1) Competition Law Review 5 (2008). 
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cooperating firm being investigated in the other jurisdiction. The threat is that agencies 
may share inculpatory evidence. Therefore, such cooperation could undermine leniency 
programmes by impairing the incentives for cartels members to cooperate.18 While this 
is a valid consideration, appropriate safeguards can be built in the cooperation 
arrangements to rule out this particular risk for leniency applicants. For example, the 
recent EU-Switzerland Cooperation Agreement explicitly rules out sharing of 
information provided under leniency programmes.19 Moreover, in the EU there is no 
EU-wide leniency system. An application for leniency at the EU level is not an 
application for leniency in any of the Member States. Firms are encouraged to 
simultaneous submit applications to the National Competition Authorities (NCAs) in 
those Member States whose markets were affected by the conduct in question.20 That 
said, the Commission clarifies that information voluntarily submitted by an applicant 
will only be transmitted to an NCA with applicant’s consent.21 While the current intra-
EU system of handling leniency applications is not free from difficulties,22 it can serve 
as an example of a workable multi-jurisdictional approach toward inter-agency 
exchange of evidence, addressing the applicants concerns. However, given the highly 
integrated nature of the EU, this arrangement should be learnt from with caution. 
Another argument raised against inter-agency evidence sharing is that such materials 
may be discoverable in recipient jurisdictions (either via rules on access to evidence or 
under the freedom of information legislation), exposing the firms involved to private 
actions for damages. The threat of discoverability could further undermine leniency 
programmes. This seems to be the reason why the US and EU leniency programmes 
                                                             
18 Chowdhury, above note 13, 13-15. 
19 See below text accompanying notes 73-78. 
20 Commission Notice on Cooperation within the Network of Competition Authorities, OJ C 101, 43-53 (2004), 
para 38. 
21 Consent is not required only in three narrowly defined situations, in which the applicant is assured that no 
sanctions will be imposed upon him by the competition authority in the receiving jurisdiction. Id. at paras 40-41. 
22 For discussion of the current leniency system in the EU, including its deficits, see Maria Jaspers, 'Designing a 
European Solution for a "One-Stop Leniency Shop"', 27(12) European Competition Law Review 685 (2006). 
7 
allow now for oral applications.23 Moreover, both the US and European competition 
authorities have a tradition of strongly protecting leniency related documents.24 In the 
EU context discoverability of leniency applications was recently tested in Pfleiderer25 
and the Court of Justice did not preclude it.26 It ruled that it is up to the national courts 
to decide on a case by case basis under which conditions to grant or refuse access under 
national law, by balancing the interests protected by EU law (effectiveness of leniency 
programmes being one of them27).28 While threat of discoverability of leniency 
documents is a challenge, it is not specific to inter-agency cooperation. The same issue 
arises when a disclosure order is addressed not to the competition authority, but to the 
leniency applicant itself in private enforcement actions at the national level.29 
It is also argued that inter-agency exchange of evidence may have negative impact on 
due process rights/ procedural fairness, especially in those jurisdictions in which 
anticompetitive conduct is subject to criminal sanctions. The high level of protection of 
                                                             
23 Compare Sweeney, above note 7, at 304. 
24 From the EU and US perspective see Caroline Cauffman, 'The Interaction of Leniency Programmes and 
Actions for Damages', 7(2) Competition Law Review 181 (2011); Samuel R. Miller, et al., 'US Discovery of 
European Union and US Leniency Applications and other Confidential Investigatory Materials', March 2010(1) CPI 
Antitrust Chronicle (2010). For more on the issue of disclosure of leniency materials from broader international 
perspective see Marc Hansen, et al., ‘New Fault Lines in International Cartel Enforcement and Administration of 
Leniency Programs- Disclosure of Immunity Applicant Statements’ (ABA International Cartel Workshop- Vancouver 
2012), <http://www.lw.com/upload/pubContent/_pdf/pub4546_1.pdf>. 
25 Case C-360/09, Pfleiderer AG v. Bundeskartellamt [2011] ECR ECR I-05161. In this case Pfleiderer, a German 
company- a purchaser of decor paper, wanted to bring a follow-on action after the Bundeskartellamt, the German 
NCA, fined a number of companies and individuals active on the decor paper manufacturing market for their 
violations of the EU competition law. Pfleiderer sought access to the case file and was dissatisfied with the limited 
access it was granted, looking for full access also to the leniency applications voluntarily submitted to the NCA under 
the German leniency scheme. The German district court hearing the case asked the ECJ for its guidance on where 
granting such access is in line with the EU law. Interestingly, AG Mazák in its Opinion distinguished between 
leniency applications and all other pre-existing documents submitted by the leniency applicant, considering that 
access to the former should not be in principle granted, whereas access to the latter should be allowed. Case C-
360/09, Opinion of Mr Advocate General Mazák in case Pfleiderer AG v. Bundeskartellamt [2011] ECR I-05161, 
paras 44-47. The District Court delivered its judgment in light of the ECJ’s ruling. Having balanced the different 
interests it granted Pfleiderer access to a non-confidential version of the case file, with the exception of the statements 
and evidence provided by the leniency applicants and the internal records of the Bundeskartellamt. District Court of 
Bonn, Decision of 18 January 2012, Case 51 Gs 53/09 (AG Bonn 2012). For discussion of possible practical 
consequences see Caroline Cauffman, ‘Access to Leniency Related Documents after Pfleiderer’ (Maastricht Faculty 
of Law Working Paper No. 3, 2012), <http://ssrn.com/paper=2004958>. See further Bruce Wardhaugh, 'Cartel 
Leniency and Effective Compensation in Europe: The Aftermath of Pfleiderer', 19(3) Web Journal of Current Legal 
Issues (2013), <http://webjcli.org/article/view/251>. 
26 Pfleiderer, above note 25, at para 32. 
27 It is noteworthy that for the first time the ECJ acknowledged that the functioning of leniency programmes is an 
interest protected by EU law. Id. at paras 25-27. Note that confidentiality is also a right protected under the EU Law. 
See below notes 47-59 and accompanying text. 
28 Id. at paras 31-32. 
29 Cauffman, above note 25, 12-13. 
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due process rights applicable in criminal investigations may be undermined if materials 
collected for the purposes of civil investigation or administrative proceedings are passed 
on and then used in a criminal investigation.30 This is a valid concern. The European 
Court of Human Rights has established that under Article 6 of the European Convention 
of Human Rights evidence obtained under compulsion in a non-judicial investigation 
may not be used to incriminate the accused in criminal proceedings.31 In the EU context 
this issue is addressed under the Regulation 1/2003. The Commission and the NCAs can 
exchange confidential information for the purpose of applying the EU competition 
provisions, but such information can only be used as evidence to impose sanctions on 
natural persons where ‘the law of the transmitting authority foresees sanctions of a 
similar kind in relation to an infringement of Article [101] or Article [102] of the 
Treaty’ or when ‘the information has been collected in a way which respects the same 
level of protection of the rights of defence of natural persons as provided for under the 
national rules of the receiving authority.’32 Similar safeguards could be introduced in 
inter-agency arrangements beyond the EU. 
There is also a mercantilistic argument against inter-agency evidence cooperation: 
the sharing of information by antitrust authorities is likely to lead to domestic 
companies being sanctioned in foreign jurisdictions, even when no harm has been 
caused by the investigated firms on their home markets.33 This would negatively affect 
national welfare. Even in a case of an international cartel challenged in a number of 
jurisdictions, from the cartel’s host state perspective the higher the foreign fines are, the 
higher is the outflow of wealth from the country and the more affected will be the fined 
                                                             
30 Chowdhury, above note 13, 19. 
31 Saunders v. United Kingdom 23 EHRR 313, para 74 (ECtHR 1997). For discussion see Renato Nazzini, 'Some 
Reflections on the Dynamics of the Due Process Discourse in EC Competition Law', 2(1) Competition Law Review 6 
(2005), at 17-19. 
32 Art. 12(3) of Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the Implementation of the Rules on 
Competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty OJ L 1, 1-25 (2003). 
33 Chowdhury, above note 13, 19-20. 
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firm’s competitive position (versus its foreign competitors). The tolerance of export 
cartels (agreements between competitors affecting only foreign markets) in virtually all 
jurisdictions is the best example that such mercantilistic considerations are present.34 
Yet this is a short-sighted approach. Firstly, it is a double-edged sword since a state that 
is unwilling to share information should expect similar, reciprocal reaction of other 
states. Secondly, such a mercantilistic approach, if followed persistently, may have 
negative spillover effects beyond competition law, potentially affecting the state’s 
foreign relations. Furthermore, such thinking presupposes that private capital (the 
challenged firm) will be in some way ‘faithful’ to the host state. This need not to be so 
and often it is not the case. Multinational firms often slice and relocate production 
processes internationally, use transfer-pricing and other tools to optimize (that is, 
minimize) their tax obligations in any given state. 
Finally and in more general terms, the issue of close inter-agency cooperation raises 
concerns about sovereignty. Sharing of evidence facilitates extraterritorial enforcement 
of foreign antitrust laws, which may be considered—either generally or in a particular 
case—as encroaching on sovereignty of the affected state.35 Such fundamental 
disagreements are nowadays rare, yet the recent enactment of blocking legislation in 
Russia in response to European Commission’s investigation of Gazprom practises in the 
EU shows that they cannot be ruled out.36 
                                                             
34 See further Marek Martyniszyn, 'Export Cartels: Is it Legal to Target Your Neighbour? Analysis in Light of 
Recent Case Law', 15(1) Journal of International Economic Law 181 (2012); D. Daniel Sokol, 'What do We Really 
Know About Export Cartels and What is the Appropriate Solution?', 4(4) Journal of Competition Law and Economics 
967 (2008). 
35 In similar vein Judge Wood, when commenting on the benefits of inter-agency cooperation, notes ‘I would not 
expect one country to assist another in pursuing a case that the first country regarded as an impermissible effort at 
extraterritorial regulation’. Compare Diane P. Wood, 'Is Cooperation Possible', 34 New England Law Review 103 
(1999), at 108-09. 
36 For discussion of blocking legislation see Marek Martyniszyn, 'Legislation Blocking Antitrust Investigations 
and the September 2012 Russian Executive Order', 37(1) World Competition 103 (2014). 
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At the same time none of the above concerns regarding inter-agency confidential 
information sharing rules out cooperation. Many of them can be addressed by suitable 
safeguards or procedural arrangements. For example, the need for protection of 
important national interests may be addressed by a provision allowing for a refusal of 
cooperation in cases of particularly high political importance, while allowing for 
cooperation in all other cases. The appropriate caveats concerning protection of 
individual procedural justice can be explicitly provided for in cooperation agreements. 
Some arguments, like the one concerning business secrets, while intuitively 
appealing, are unsubstantiated. The object of exchange between agencies in this context 
is not ‘the secret formula for Coca-Cola’, a trade secret, but the proof of antitrust 
violation.37 Moreover, while under merger review the authorities are likely to analyse 
business sensitive information such as strategies or future plans (prospective focus of 
review), historic information (retrospective data) is the focus of cartel investigations.38 
Investigators are looking for, for example, evidence of meetings or communications 
between firms, regarding pricing, markets, or sales policies. In practice such evidence is 
often found in handwritten notes, calendars entries, phone logs, and does not address 
important prospective business strategy.39 
As Matsushita rightly points out, if exchange of evidence could have been achieved, 
for example, in tax law (for instance, under the US-Japan Tax Treaty), it should be 
possible also in competition law.40 This effectively debunks what Hammond calls one 
of the myths and misconceptions concerning inter-agency information sharing. He 
argues that there is no reason why antitrust violations should be treated differently from 
                                                             
37 Hammond, above note 15, 4-5. 
38 Id. at 5. 
39 Id. 
40 Mitsuo Matsushita, 'International Cooperation in the Enforcement of Competition Policy', 1 Washington 
University Global Studies Law Review 463 (2002), at 473. 
11 
deceit or fraud.41 The issue of competition law criminalization aside,42 it is difficult not 
to agree with Hammond’s argument.  
Nevertheless, the lack of a widespread mechanism allowing for close cooperation 
between agencies, as Judge Wood notes,43 means that: (1) states value ‘sovereign 
prerogatives above the added benefits for competition law enforcement’, and 
(2) companies are satisfied with the reality in which the antitrust authorities ‘must 
operate with one hand tied behind their back’. There should be no doubt that companies 
suffer harm from anticompetitive conduct. While many may try to pass on the harm to 
their customers (and ultimately consumers) by raising prices, this will not always 
happen, especially on very competitive markets. Therefore there is no reason why 
legally compliant businesses should not favour information sharing arrangements 
between agencies.44 
II.  PROTECTION OF CONFIDENTIALITY: 
THE EU AND US PERSPECTIVES 
At the international level there is no common definition of confidential information.45 
Definitions and standards of protection differ between jurisdictions. In the EU 
confidentiality is protected by provisions of both primary and secondary EU law. 
Article 339 TFEU prohibits disclosure of ‘information of the kind covered by the 
                                                             
41 Scott D. Hammond, 'Beating Cartels at Their Own Game- Sharing Information in the Fight' (Symposium on 
Competition Policy by the Competition Policy Research Center, Fair Trade Commission of Japan, Tokyo 2003), 6-7, 
<http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/201614.pdf>. 
42 For normative discussion and analysis see Bruce Wardhaugh, 'A Normative Approach to the Criminalisation of 
Cartel Activity', 32(3) Legal Studies 369 (2012). 
43 Wood, above note 35, at 110. 
44 In this vein also Hammond, above note 15, 11-12. From a compliance perspective, it is also a matter of how 
antitrust violations and the enforcement efforts are perceived by the business community and the general public. If in 
a particular regime anticompetitive conduct is thought of as some sort of ‘bad business practice’ and not as socially 
and morally unacceptable conduct, enforcement efforts may be seen as unfair or illegitimate. See, for example, 
Christine Parker, 'The “Compliance” Trap: The Moral Message in Responsive Regulatory Enforcement', 40(3) Law 
& Society Review 591 (2006). 
45 For a brief overview of the criteria commonly used to define confidential information see International 
Enforcement Co-operation: Secretariat Report on the OECD/ICN Survey on International Enforcement Co-operation, 
above note 6, at 121-122. 
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obligation of professional secrecy, in particular information about undertakings, their 
business relations or their cost components.’46 
This general rule is implemented in the area of competition law by the Council 
Regulation 1/2003,47 which gives the European Commission investigative powers in the 
field of competition law. The unique and one-of-its kind intra-EU arrangement aside,48 
the information collected by the Commission may be used ‘only for the purpose for 
which it was acquired’.49 The Commission and the NCAs, their officials and other 
persons working under their supervision are under an obligation not to disclose 
‘information acquired or exchanged by them pursuant to this Regulation and of the kind 
covered by the obligation of professional secrecy.’50 For example, on this basis in 2004 
the Commission rejected the Turkish competition authority’s request to access evidence 
collected by the Commission in its investigation on the electrical equipment market.51  
Furthermore, under the Commission’s Staff Regulation52 any unauthorized disclosure 
of information is prohibited, unless that information has already been made public or is 
accessible to the public.53 The officials are bound by this prohibition also after leaving 
the service for the Commission.54 In case of damage caused by a breach of 
confidentiality in violation of the aforementioned provisions by the Commission’s staff 
                                                             
46 See in greater details Christopher Kerse and Nicholas Khan, EC Antitrust Procedure (London: Sweet & 
Maxwell, 2005), paras 2-069-2-073. 
47 Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003, above note 32. So as to facilitate protection of confidential information in 
competition cases, the European Commission’s DG Competition published guidance on confidentiality of 
submissions. It summarized what sort of information may and what may not constitute business secrets and other 
confidential information under EU law. European Commission, ‘Annex on Business Secrets and Other Confidential 
Information’ (2012), <http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/business_secrets_en.pdf>. This guidance was 
followed by a publication of an even more practical note, including examples of how to mark confidential 
information in documents and how to prepare their non-confidential versions. See European Commission, ‘DG 
Competition Informal Guidance Paper on Confidentiality Claims’ (2012), 
<http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/guidance_en.pdf>. 
48 See below notes 70-72 and accompanying text. 
49 Art. 28(1) of the Regulation, above note 32. 
50 Id. at Art. 28(2). 
51 Maher M. Dabbah, International and Comparative Competition Law (Cambridge: CUP, 2010) 519-20. 
52 Council Regulation (EC, EURATOM) No 723/2004 of 22 March 2004 amending the Staff Regulations of 
officials of the European Communities and the Conditions of Employment of other servants of the European 
Communities, OJ L 124, 1-118 (2004). 
53 Id. at Art. 17(1). 
54 Id. at Art. 17(2). 
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in the performance of their duties, an undertaking could bring an action for damages 
against the Union under Article 340(2) TFEU.55 Extralegally, any breach of 
confidentiality by the Commission’s or NCA’s staff would cause considerable 
reputational damage, both to the institution and the individual concerned. 
Adams v Commission is probably the most infamous case on breach of EU rules on 
confidentiality in competition law enforcement.56 In the underlying proceedings, in the 
mid-1970s, the Commission made available to the investigated Swiss firm (later found 
in violation of EU rules57) copies of the documents provided by Adams—the 
informant—without his consent.58 This allowed the firm to identify Adams. On return to 
Switzerland he was arrested, and later convicted of industrial espionage. Subsequently, 
the ECJ found the Commission in breach of its obligations regarding confidentiality. 
Adams was awarded damages.59 This case shows that even most striking breaches of 
confidentiality may occur in the well-developed competition regimes. 
Similarly high standard of confidentiality is provided for under US legislation. Under 
the Antitrust Civil Process Act (ACPA), laying down the rules governing civil 
investigations, no documents or transcripts produced pursuant to a compulsory process 
can be made publicly available without the consent of the party that provided such 
materials.60 They may be used, when necessary, before any court, grand jury or federal 
agencies. They may be also disclosed to either body of the Congress or to any 
                                                             
55 If the conduct giving rise to damage was performed outside the course of the official duties, the EU will not be 
liable. The undertaking should bring then an action for damages against the individual involved before a competent 
(ratione loci) national court and the issue of liability would be addressed under the law of the forum. Alina 
Kaczorowska, European Union Law, 2nd ed. (London: Routledge-Cavendish, 2010) 466-83; Trevor C. Hartley, The 
Foundations of European Union Law, 7th ed. (Oxford: OUP, 2010) 451-64. 
56 Case 145/83 Stanley Adams v Commission, [1985] ECR 3539. 
57 European Commission, 76/642/EEC, Decision of 9 June 1976 Relating to a Proceeding under Article 86 of the 
Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, IV/29.020- Vitamins, OJ L223, 27-38 (1976). The decision 
was confirmed in all essential respects. See Case 85/76, Hoffmann-La Roche v. Commission, [1979] ECR 461. 
58 Id. at 3589-3590. 
59 Adams also complained that the Commission failed to warn him about the threat of criminal investigation upon 
his return to Switzerland. This was another factor which gave rise to Commission’s liability. Adam’s dramatic story, 
involving his wife suicide, served as a basis for a movie ‘A Song for Europe’ (1985), directed by John Goldschmidt. 
For details see <http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0088964/>. 
60 15 U.S.C. Section 1313 (c)(3). 
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authorised committee or subcommittee thereof. Also the Federal Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 6(e), governing grand jury investigations (criminal cases), prevents the US 
antitrust authorities from sharing information which they have obtained in the course of 
their proceedings.61 Similar provisions can be found in the Clayton Act62 and the 
Federal Trade Commission Act.63 
Even the Agreements between the United States and the European Commission,64 
two closely cooperating antitrust regimes, while explicitly recognizing common interest 
in sharing information,65 did not alter the existing laws governing confidentiality.66 
Moreover, the Cooperation Agreement underlined that neither Party was required to 
provide the other Party any information which disclosure was prohibited under the law 
of the requested Party.67 The net effect of the Agreement in terms of information 
exchange is that the agencies can share confidential information only if the source of the 
information explicitly grants a waiver.68 However, there are other agreements and even 
unilateral arrangements, which provide for sharing of confidential information between 
agencies. These are discussed in the following part. 
                                                             
61 Rule 6(e)(3) lists expectations allowing for disclosure of grand jury materials, and although there is little 
precedent in this regard it seems that none of exceptions would apply in case of a request from a foreign competition 
agency. American Bar Association, Section of Antitrust Law, International Antitrust Cooperation Handbook (ABA, 
Section of Antitrust Law, 2004) 26-28. 
62 ‘Any information or documentary material filed with the Assistant Attorney General or the Federal Trade 
Commission pursuant to this section shall be exempt from disclosure …, and no such information or documentary 
material may be made public, except as may be relevant to any administrative or judicial action or proceeding.’ 15 
U.S.C. Section 18(a)(h), as amended by the Hart Scott-Rodino Act of 1976. 
63 ‘… the Commission shall not have any authority to make public any trade secret or any commercial or 
financial information which is obtained from any person and which is privileged or confidential, except that the 
Commission may disclose such information to officers and employees of appropriate Federal law enforcement 
agencies or to any officer or employee of any State law enforcement agency upon the prior certification of an officer 
of any such Federal or State law enforcement agency that such information will be maintained in confidence and will 
be used only for official law enforcement purposes.’ 15 U.S.C. Section 46(f). See also 15 U.S.C. Section 57-2(b). 
64 Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Commission of the European 
Community Regarding the Application of Their Competition Laws, OJ L 95, 47 (1995), Agreement between the 
European Communities and the Government of the United States of America on the Application of Positive Comity 
Principles in the Enforcement of Their Competition Laws, OJ L 173, 28 (1998). 
65 Art. III of the 1995 Cooperation Agreement, above note 64.  
66 Id. at Art. IX. The Positive Comity Agreement did not introduce any changes in this regard. 
67 Such a disclosure is also not required if it would be incompatible with important interests of the Party 
possessing the information. Compare Art. VIII(1) of the Cooperation Agreement, above note 64. 
68 Chowdhury, above note 13, 9. 
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III. EXISTING LEGAL FRAMEWORKS ALLOWING FOR EXCHANGE OR 
SHARING OF EVIDENCE  
Generally sharing of confidential information between agencies transnationally is 
possible only when special rules to that end have been adopted. The intra-EU 
framework in that regard is the most far-reaching one. It allows NCAs to exchange 
evidence, and also to carry out inspections and other fact-finding measures for other 
NCAs. Apart from this unique intra-EU arrangement, there are few legal instruments 
(bilateral or plurilateral), allowing for confidential information sharing. Besides these 
special tools legislation of a few states (most notably of Australia, Canada, and UK) 
permits, under certain circumstances, their competition authorities to share confidential 
information unilaterally (without any specific agreement in that regard).69 In this part 
such international and domestic solutions will be identified and evaluated from the 
perspective of their practical relevance in transnational competition law enforcement. 
The attention is first turned towards the special intra-EU framework. 
The case of the EU is unique. While the European Commission remains the main 
enforcer, EU competition law is also enforced at the national level. In this intra-EU 
context, NCAs collaborate very closely. Under the Regulation 1/2003 they can 
exchange evidence, including confidential information, for the purpose of applying EU 
competition provisions.70 Moreover, NCAs are empowered to carry out inspections and 
other fact-finding measures under their national laws in the enforcement of EU 
competition laws, on behalf and for the account of NCAs from other Member States.71 
Recognising differences in competition law between Member States, special safeguards 
were incorporated to prevent any negative impact on due process rights.72 While these 
                                                             
69 Compare OECD, above note 9, at 40. 
70 Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003, above note 32, Art. 12.  
71 Art. 22(1) of the Regulation. 
72 See above text accompanying notes 30-32. 
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are very close forms of cooperation in enforcement, any lessons drawn from intra-EU 
experience must acknowledge that this framework was developed against the backdrop 
of years of European integration and trust-building.  
It should be added that in May 2013 the European Union signed a new Cooperation 
Agreement with the Swiss Confederation regarding competition law enforcement.73 
After coming into force74 the Agreement will allow competition authorities to exchange 
evidence, albeit only in parallel proceedings.75 It also incorporates a number of 
safeguards. For example, neither Party is required to offer such assistance if it was to be 
incompatible with its important interests or unduly burdensome.76 Information obtained 
under leniency programmes or settlement procedures cannot be discussed or exchanged 
without the express consent of the source.77 Furthermore, discussed or exchanged 
information cannot be used to impose sanctions on natural persons.78 Overall, the 
Agreement is a significant step forward in EU-Swiss enforcement cooperation in 
competition law. 
Internationally, the first legal instruments which enabled closer cooperation between 
antitrust agencies were Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties in Criminal Matters (MLATs). 
MLATs are bilateral or, occasionally, plurilateral agreements, popularized by the US,79 
facilitating gathering and access to foreign-based evidence in criminal cases.80 Given 
                                                             
73 'Agreement between the European Union and the Swiss Confederation Concerning Cooperation on the 
Application of Their Competition Laws', (2013), 
<http://ec.europa.eu/competition/international/bilateral/agreement_eu_ch_en.pdf>. See discussed in Patrik Ducrey, 
'The Agreement between Switzerland and the EU Concerning Cooperation in the Application of their Competition 
Laws', 4(5) Journal of European Competition Law & Practice 437 (2013). 
74 The Agreement is not yet in force. It awaits consent of the European Parliament. For current statute of the 
Agreement see < http://ec.europa.eu/competition/international/bilateral/>. 
75 Art. 7(4) of the Agreement, above note 73. 
76 Id. Art. 7(5). 
77 Id. Art. 7(6). 
78 Id. Art. 8(4). 
79 US signed its first agreement of this kind in 1973. See Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters between 
Switzerland and the United States, signed 25 May 1973, entered into force 23 January 1977, 27 UST 2019, TIAS 
8302. Under Art.2(1)(c)(4) this Agreement is inapplicable to antitrust. 
80 A notable exception is the US-German MLAT which provides for US assistance with regard to ‘regulatory 
offences under German antitrust law’. Treaty between the United States of America and the Federal Republic of 
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that relatively few jurisdictions treat infringements of competition laws as criminal 
offences,81 and that MLATs usually require that the conduct at stake is treated as a 
crime in both jurisdictions before the cooperation can take place (the dual criminality 
requirement), the impact of MLATs is limited. For example, the MLAT between the US 
and EU82 is inapplicable in antitrust as the European Commission itself has no inherent 
criminal law powers and it is constrained in competition law enforcement by the rules 
governing both exchange of information and general rules on confidentiality.83 The 
MLATs between US and Canada, and US and UK allow for cooperation in antitrust 
cases.84  
                                                                                                                                                                                  
Germany on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, Treaty Doc. 108-27, 108th Cong. 2d Sess.; Exec. Rept. 
109-14, 109th Cong. 2d Sess. (2003). Note that in 2006 the US and Germany signed a Supplementary Treaty (Treaty 
Doc. 109-13, 109th Cong. 2d Sess.). Both Treaties entered into force in October 2009. Rachel Brandenburger, the 
Special Advisor, International to the Assistant Attorney General for the US DoJ Antitrust Division (since 2010), 
considered the stipulations of the US-German MLAT ‘unique’, being ‘a product of long-term US-German 
cooperation’. Rachel Brandenburger, ‘The Many Facets of International Cooperation at the Antitrust Division’, 5, n 8 
(Remarks as Prepared for International Bar Association Midyear Conference, Madrid 2012), 
<http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/284239.pdf>. 
81 See Mark Furse, 'Issues Relating to the Enforcement and Application of Criminal Laws in Respect of 
Competition' in Philip Marsden (ed), Handbook of Research in Trans-Atlantic Antitrust (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 
2006). Compare Katalin J. Cseres, et al. (eds), Criminalization of Competition Law Enforcement: Economic and 
Legal Implications for the EU Member States (Edward Elgar, 2006). In the aftermath of criminalization of 
competition law the pre-existing extradition treaties become a potentially powerful tool in antitrust enforcement. This 
issue was at the heart of the Norris case. In 2002, in connection with a US antitrust investigation in a carbon 
components manufacturing cartel, two UK-based subsidiaries of one of the US companies involved pleaded guilty to 
counts of tampering with witnesses and documents destruction. The US grand jury indicted Ian Norris, the former 
CEO of one of the subsidiaries, on obstruction of justice and price-fixing counts. The US DoJ sought to extradite 
Norris to the US under the US-UK Extradition Treaty. This attempted initially failed. In 2008 the House of Lords 
held that price fixing was not considered a crime in the UK at the time in question (that is before the introduction of 
the cartel offence in the UK in 2003), and the US-UK Extradition Treaty required double criminality. Yet, the Lords 
had left the question open whether Norris could be extradited on the ground of the obstruction of justice. The lower 
courts allowed for extradition on this basis (later affirmed by the UK Supreme Court). In March 2010, after the 
ECtHR rejected Norris’ appeal on human rights grounds, the UK extradited Norris to stand trial in the US. For the US 
DoJ Antitrust Division it was the first time to succeed in seeking extradition of a foreign national. In 2010 Norris was 
found guilty of conspiring to obstruct justice. He was sentenced to serve eighteen months in prison. The Norris case 
brought the extradition issue into the limelight for the antitrust audience, although its impact is rather limited. Most 
extradition treaties contain the double criminality requirement. Some older treaties list extraditable offences, but the 
cartel offence is not to be found on such lists. Moreover, some jurisdictions do not extradite their own citizens (for 
example Germany), or retain discretion in this regard (for example Australia). In effect, it seems that extradition on 
competition law grounds can effectively take place only among the US, the UK, Ireland, and Canada. See further 
James A. Wilson, ‘Extradition: The New Sword or the Mouse that Roared?’, 4 Antitrust Source (2011), 
<http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/antitrust_source/apr11-wilson_4-20f.authcheckdam.pdf>. 
For the analysis of Norris and its implication for the UK competition law enforcement see Peter Whelan, 'Resisting 
the Long Arm of Criminal Antitrust Laws: Norris v The United States', 72(2) Modern Law Review 272 (2009). 
82 Agreement on Mutual Legal Assistance between the European Union and the United States of America, OJ L 
181, 34 (2003). See further See Julian M. Joshua, 'Mutual Legal Assistance. Brave New World: A North Atlantic 
Triple Entente against cartels?', March 2004 Competition Law Insight 16 (2004), at 17. 
83 In this context see above notes 46-54 and accompanying text.  
84 The US-UK MLAT was originally amended by an exchange of diplomatic notes and made inapplicable to 
antitrust investigations. This exception was later abandoned under the Agreement concerning the Application of the 
Treat on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters (effected by an exchange of notes dated 30 April and 1 May 
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More recent MLATs tend not to require double criminality85 or require it only for 
certain types of assistance.86 Therefore the US could, in principle, request assistance 
under such MLATs in antitrust cases, although it may be that in this area of law 
assistance would be either discretionary under particular MLATs, or would be simply 
rejected as prejudicial to the receiving country’s sovereignty or its essential interests.87 
In any case, such assistance would be largely one-sided as relatively few jurisdictions 
criminalized their competition laws and therefore they are unable to rely on MLATs to 
seek help of US agencies in their investigations.88  
It seems that the first MLAT which specifically covered antitrust crimes was signed 
in 1985 between the US and Canada.89 This Treaty obliges both parties to assist each 
other in ‘investigation, prosecution and suppression of offences’.90 The antitrust 
criminal cases fall under the scope of the Treaty under the notion of ‘consumer 
protection’.91 The commitment to cooperation is expansive. It includes cooperation 
irrespective of whether the conduct at stake constitutes an offence or may be prosecuted 
in the Requested State (no double criminality requirement).92 This is somewhat limited 
given that the assistance may be denied if the request under the Treaty is considered 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
2001). As the UK later introduced criminal sanctions for competition law violations (under the Enterprise Act 2002), 
antitrust agencies from both jurisdictions can avail of the MLAT in criminal antitrust cases. Compare International 
Antitrust Cooperation Handbook, above note 61, at 276-77; Julian M. Joshua, et al., 'Extradition and Mutual Legal 
Assistance Treaties: Cartel Enforcement's Global Reach', 75 Antitrust Law Journal 353 (2008), at 389. 
85 For example, the MLAT between the US and South Korea provides, in Art. 3(2), that the assistance with regard 
to certain categories of crimes shall be provided irrespective of whether the conduct at stake constitutes an offence in 
the Requested State. Annex to the Treaty lists these categories, among them, under para 20: ‘(o)ffenses against the 
laws relating to prohibition of private monopolies or unfair business translations or practices’, which cover antitrust 
offences. Treaty between the United States of America and the Republic of Korea on Mutual Legal Assistance in 
Criminal Matters, Treaty Doc. 104-1 (1995). 
86 Bruce Zagaris, 'United States Treaties on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters' in M. Cherif Bassiouni (ed), 
International Criminal Law: Multilateral and Bilateral Enforcement Mechanisms, 3rd ed. (Martinus Nijhoff, 2008) 
388-89. 
87 Julian M. Joshua, 'Mutual Legal Assistance. Brave New World: A North Atlantic Triple Entente against 
cartels?', March 2004 Competition Law Insight 16 (2004), at 17-18. 
88 But for German competition authority which can, under the special provisions of the US-German MLAT, 
request help from US counterparts in its administrative proceedings. See above note 80. 
89 Canada- United States: Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, 24 I.L.M. 1092 (1985). 
Compare Spencer Weber Waller, 'The Internationalization of Antitrust Enforcement', 77 Boston University Law 
Review 343 (1997), at 370. 
90 Art. 2(1) of the Treaty, above note 89. 
91 Annex to the Treaty defines the scope of its applicability by clarifying that it covers offences under US laws in 
such categories as securities, wildlife, environmental and consumer protection. 
92 Art. 2(3) of the Treaty, above note 89. 
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contrary to the Requested State’s public interest,93 which is a standard provision in 
MLATs. Since its introduction the US-Canada MLAT has been actively utilized in 
criminal antitrust cases.94 
From antitrust enforcement perspective despite their advantages MLATs suffer from 
various limitations. As MLATs apply to criminal investigations they are generally of no 
use in administrative proceedings or civil cases. Moreover, provisions of MLATs do not 
necessarily override domestic rules governing confidentiality. Not all competition 
authorities may be able to share information obtained through their own enforcement 
measures.95 This drawback applies also to US agencies, which due to the stringency of 
US rules on confidentiality in criminal matters (which are not overridden by provisions 
of MLATs) are unable to share grand jury materials.96 
So as to address some of the limitations of MLATs in antitrust, in 1994 the US 
Congress enacted the International Antitrust Enforcement Assistance Act (IAEAA).97 
The Act was intended to improve access to foreign-based evidence in civil antitrust 
cases, including information collected by the agencies through their own investigatory 
powers.98 The IAEAA created a framework under which the Federal Trade Commission 
(FTC) and DoJ are empowered to negotiate antitrust mutual assistance agreements 
                                                             
93 Id. at Art. 5(1)(b). 
94 Waller, above note 89, at 368. 
95 For example, Section 29 of the Canadian Competition Act provides for rigid confidentiality protection. 
Competition Act, RSC 1985, c C-34, <http://canlii.ca/t/krnt>. The Canadian legislation implementing the US-Canada 
MLAT, in its Section 3(1), provides that the provisions of the Act override provisions of other statutes but for those 
which prohibit the disclosure of information or prohibit disclosure of information except under certain conditions. 
Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Act, RSC 1985, c 30 (4th Supp), <http://canlii.ca/t/hz0l>. In practice it 
means that Canadian authorities cannot share with US counterparts information obtained in their own investigations. 
This has no impact on passing on information obtained pursuant to requests under the MLAT as that is a separate 
procedure not falling under the confidentiality requirement of the Competition Act. 
96 See above note 61 and accompanying text. 
97 15 U.S.C. Sections 6201-6212. 
98 The IAEAA defines antitrust evidence broadly as encompassing ‘information, testimony, statements, 
documents, or other things that are obtained in anticipation of, or during the course of, an investigation or proceeding 
under any of the Federal antitrust laws or any of the foreign antitrust laws.’ 15 U.S.C. Section 6211(1). 
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(AMAAs) allowing for exchange of confidential information99 on a mutual basis (a 
condition sine qua non) with foreign counterparts, while preserving its 
confidentiality.100 Exchange of information under AMAAs applies to criminal, civil and 
merger matters. The assistance may be provided regardless of whether the conduct in 
question violates US antitrust laws.101 Apart from sharing information, the US agencies 
may actively use their powers to gather evidence for the use by foreign counterparts.102 
Moreover, on an application of the Attorney General a US district court may order a 
person to, for example, give testimony or a statement in a particular form, including 
under oath.103 These provisions explicitly allow for taking evidence in line with foreign 
procedures (so long as they are in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure),104 addressing admissibility of so-obtained evidence in foreign proceedings. 
The IAEAA makes an exception to US rules governing confidentiality and enables 
the US agencies to share information obtained through civil investigative demands with 
signatories of AMAAs.105 Moreover, provisions of the IAEAA expand the list of 
exceptions allowing for disclosure of grand jury materials, regardless of whether the 
foreign competition laws are civil, criminal, or administrative in nature, so long as the 
foreign authority shows ‘a particularized need’ for such disclosure.106 
                                                             
99 A reservation was made with regard to information received by the antitrust authorities under pre-merger 
notification system. 15 U.S.C. Section 6204(1). This provision was called for by the US business community which 
argued that any inappropriate disclosure of merger-related materials, as particularly sensitive and prospective in 
nature, would cause a serious damage to the competitiveness of US firms. Laurie N. Freeman, 'US-Canadian 
Information Sharing and the International Antitrust Enforcement Assistance Act of 1994', 84 Georgetown Law 
Journal 339 (1995), at 357-58. 
100 15 U.S.C. Section 6211(2)(b). 
101 15 U.S.C. Section 6202(c). 
102 15 U.S.C. Section 6202(b). 
103 15 U.S.C. Section 6203. 
104 15 U.S.C. Section 6203(b)(2)(B). 
105 15 U.S.C. Section 6205. 
106 15 U.S.C Section 6204(2). Compare above note 61. For more detailed discussion of the changes made by the 
IAEAA with regard to disclosure of grand jury materials and the understanding of the notion of ‘a particularized 
need’, not defined in the IAEAA, see International Antitrust Cooperation Handbook, above note 61, at 50-51. 
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The first and only agreement adopted under the IAEAA107 was entered into between 
the US and Australia in 1999.108 It follows the spirit of the IAEAA and commits both 
Parties to offer each other assistance and cooperate in providing and obtaining antitrust 
evidence.109 The said assistance includes disclosure and exchange of evidence, taking 
testimonies, obtaining documentary evidence, as well as executing searches and 
seizures.110 The US-Australia Agreement has been availed of at least once by Australia 
in its investigation of the Vitamins cartel.111 It is unclear if that was the same or another 
case but the Australian authorities report gaining access, under the Agreement, to US 
grand jury materials, which proved very useful in the Australian investigation.112  
While the IAEAA created a new framework for cooperation agreements, it seems 
that other states would benefit little from entering into AMAAs with the US. Firstly, 
apart from the EU there was, at least in past, little appetite for extraterritorial 
enforcement of competition laws. Entering into an AMAA with the US (whose laws 
provide for far-reaching extraterritorial jurisdiction and whose antitrust agencies have 
the necessary capacity to avail of it) could be seen as simply allowing the US agencies 
to reach for foreign firms with little benefit offered in return, and at considerable sunk 
costs (involved in the negotiation of the agreement). Secondly, foreign parties to a large 
extent already have access to US-based evidence thanks to means of international 
                                                             
107 Federal Trade Commission, ‘First International Antitrust Assistance Agreement Under New Law Announced 
By FTC And DOJ’ (17 April 1997), <http://www.ftc.gov/opa/1997/04/iaeaa.shtm>. Waller notes that after the 
IAEAA entered into force the US antitrust agencies started talks with the Canadian government with an aim to 
conclude an AMAA. This was the logical step, taking into consideration the close cooperation between authorities 
under the existing MLAT. Yet such an AMAA between the US and Canada has not been signed. Waller, above note 
89, at 373-74. 
108 Agreement between the Government of the United States and the Government of Australia on Mutual 
Antitrust Enforcement Assistance, 1999 U.S.T. LEXIS 198 (1999). 
109 Id. at Art. II(A). 
110 Id. at Art. II(E). 
111 In this vein Chowdhury, above note 13, 12. 
112 ‘Improving International Co-operation in Cartel Investigations. Contribution from Australia under Session II 
of the Global Forum on Competition’, DAF/COMP/GF/WD(2012)36, paras 19-24 (24 January 2012), 
<http://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=DAF/COMP/GF/WD%282012%2936&d
ocLanguage=En>. 
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judicial assistance (letters rogatory and letters of request113) which are not contingent in 
the US on reciprocity (although not all competition authorities are empowered to use 
them114). Thirdly, under the IAEAA’s provisions parties retain discretion whether to 
offer assistance in particular cases.115 In 1997 Waller concluded that ‘there is no reason 
to believe that the waiting line [to sign an agreement with the US under the IAEAA] 
will be very long’116 and time proved him right. 
Apart from these US-initiated agreements, there are two cases of inter-agency 
cooperation in other parts of the world: among the Nordic countries and between 
Australia and New Zealand. In the former case the Agreement Regarding Cooperation 
in Competition Cases was concluded in 2001 between Denmark, Iceland and 
Norway.117 In 2003 it was joined by Sweden.118 Article IV of the Agreement provides 
that the competition authorities of the Parties to the Agreement can exchange classified 
information, subject to the equivalent confidentiality protection in the receiving states, 
and only for competition law purposes. It is difficult to evaluate how robust is the 
cooperation under the Agreement. Article IV is most often invoked in cartel cases, but 
the Swedish Competition Authority has also exchanged information in merger cases 
with Finish and Norwegian counterparts, albeit no details were made public.119 
Similarly, a common contribution concerning cooperation within the Nordic Cartel 
                                                             
113 See generally OECD, Competition Law Enforcement. International Co-operation in the Collection of 
Information (Paris, 1984), Annex II: Explanatory Note on Letters Rogatory or Letters of Request. 
114 For example, it seems that the European Commission is not equipped with such a power as it is not provided 
for under the Regulation 1/2003, above n 32, or the Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the 
Control of Concentrations between Undertakings (the EC Merger Regulation) OJ L 24, 1-22 (2004). 
115 Since Australia entered into the Agreement with the US, the Australian authorities must have considered it a 
beneficial step. Allan Asher, then the Acting Chairman of the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission 
noted that the Agreement will help the ACCC to address challenges posed by international cartels. He also pointed 
out that the Agreement would assist the Commission in dealing with the increasing numbers of mergers at the global 
level. ACCC, ‘Gobal Enforcement Co-Operation’, MR 047/99 (28 April 1999), 
<http://www.accc.gov.au/content/index.phtml/itemId/322854/fromItemId/378008?pageDefinitionItemId=16940>. 
116 In this vein Waller, above note 89, at 378. 
117 Reprinted in United Nations, Treaty Series, Vol. 2154, No.1-37613, 199 (2001). 
118 Agreement on Amendments and on Accession by Sweden to the Agreement between Denmark, Iceland and 
Norway Concerning Cooperation in Matters of Competitions, signed in Helsinki on 9 April 2003, reprinted in United 
Nations, Treaty Series, Vol. 2308, No. A-37613, 241 (2005). 
119 E-mails from Karin Lunning, Director of International Affairs at the Swedish Competition Authority of 26 and 
31 January 2012 (on file with the author). 
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Network (NCN, encompassing Denmark, Faroe Islands, Finland, Iceland, Norway, 
Sweden, and, from 2010, Greenland) indicated that confidential and sensitive 
information has been exchanged, but without providing any particulars.120 Such 
exchanges could take place either between the Nordic states which are members of the 
EU under Regulation 1/2003, or between parties to the 2001 Nordic Cooperation 
Agreement.  
Apart from the proximity of competition laws, the members of the NCN point out to 
a number of extralegal factors facilitating their cooperation. These include cultural 
similarities, similarity of business communities (large MNCs often distinguish Nordic 
region from other parts of Europe and operate a common Nordic offices to run their 
business operations in the Nordic states), and low staff turnover in the agencies.121 This 
suggests that mutual understanding and trust are of great practical importance for 
advanced forms of inter-agency cooperation. 
Similarly to the Nordic countries, Australia and New Zealand have many 
commonalities. In the legal sphere, New Zealand’s competition law is modelled on 
Australian legislation.122 The close ties between both jurisdictions were further 
strengthened in 2007 by the adoption of a Cooperation Agreement, in which Parties 
committed themselves to use their best efforts to exchange and provide information.123 
They acknowledged that it is ‘in their common interest to share information, evidence 
and documentation’ facilitating, inter alia, ‘effective enforcement and promotion of 
                                                             
120 ‘The Nordic Cartel Network: A Regional Model for Cooperation between Cartel Units of Competition 
Authorities. Joint Contribution by Denmark the Faroe Islands, Finland, Greenland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden 
under Session II of the Global Forum on Competition’, DAF/COMP/GF/WD(2012)34, para 12 (19 January 2012), 
<http://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=DAF/COMP/GF/WD%282012%2934&d
ocLanguage=En>. 
121 Id. at para 6.  
122 See generally Allan Fels and Zaven Mardirossian, 'Cooperation, Comity, and Competition Policy in Australia' 
in Andrew T. Guzman (ed), Cooperation, Comity, and Competition Policy (Oxford: OUP, 2011) 180-81. 
123 Cooperation Agreement between the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission and the New 
Zealand Commerce Commission (2007), on file with the author, Art. 2.2. 
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their respective competition, consumer and regulatory functions’124 and ‘coordination of 
investigations, prosecutions’.125 The Parties obliged themselves not only to maintain 
confidentiality of the information ‘to the fullest extent possible’,126 but also to ‘use 
[their] best efforts to oppose … any application by a third party … for disclosure of 
such confidential information’,127 directly addressing some of the popularly raised 
concerns regarding inter-agency information sharing.128 That said, the Agreement did 
not supersede domestic legislation. Hence to unravel the true scope for cooperation one 
needs to look into relevant rules in both states. 
Under Section 155AAA of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010129 the 
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) has discretionary power to 
share confidential information with foreign counterparts, even if there is no special 
intergovernmental or inter-agency agreement in place. This is an important 
development, indicating that the concerns regarding inter-agency sharing of confidential 
information130 can be successfully addressed. The New Zealand Commerce 
Commission (NZCC) has already utilized the Australian provision on several occasions. 
For example, in the 2010 Air Ambulance cartel case, investigated in both jurisdictions, 
the NZCC officially requested access to some of the confidential transcripts, which was 
granted by the ACCC, on certain conditions related to disclosure of such shared 
evidence.131  
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The Australian—New Zealand relationship was initially asymmetrical. The situation 
begun to change with the passing of the Commerce (International Co-operation, and 
Fees) Amendment Act 2012.132 The Act authorizes the NZCC to provide investigative 
assistance to and to share confidential information (also compulsorily obtained) with 
foreign counterparts. It contains numerous safeguards, for example, ruling out 
cooperation if it was to harm New Zealand’s international trade interests.133 It also 
prevents from sharing of any statements made to the NZCC, if that could lead to 
incrimination of the statements’ author, unless the foreign counterpart provides written 
assurances that it will not happen.134 This new regulatory framework differs from the 
Australian regime, inter alia, by requiring that an intergovernmental or inter-agency 
agreement is in place prior to any such cooperation.135 
Due to that later requirement and in order to balance out cooperation capacity in 
April 2013 the NZCC entered into new Cooperation Arrangement with the ACCC 
(without prejudice to the 2007 Cooperation Agreement).136 The Arrangement contains 
all the safeguards laid down in the recent New Zealand’s legislation and it is so far the 
only one within that framework.137 It makes the bilateral cooperation more even. Rod 
Sims, the ACCC Chairman, rightly reflected that the Australian-New Zealand 
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relationship benefits from ‘probably the most complete set of cooperation arrangements 
[in competition law]… globally, outside countries who have established cross border 
enforcers, such as the EU.’138 
Both states not only allowed for greater cooperation between their competition 
authorities, but they also earlier bilaterally extended the jurisdictional scope of their 
domestic competition law provisions prohibiting abuse of the dominant position to the 
whole trans-Tasman market. This was also coupled with the introduction of provisions 
allowing for certain extraterritorial, or more accurately—trans-Tasman enforcement 
measures. In this regard under Section 155A of the Trade Practices Act the ACCC can 
require persons in New Zealand to provide documents or information in relation to 
possible abuse of a dominant position in a trans-Tasman market. The information may 
be provided to the NZCC, which would then pass it on to the ACCC. Importantly, it is 
an offence in New Zealand not to comply with such requests. Under the Section 155B 
of the Act reciprocal rights are provided to the NZCC. At the same time the ACCC 
cannot order a person in New Zealand to give evidence before it. It cannot also directly 
conduct enforcement activities in New Zealand. Moreover, in trans-Tasman competition 
cases an Australian court may, if that is more convenient or fair, conduct proceedings or 
deliver the judgment in New Zealand (the same applies the other way round).139  
While this case of bilateral cooperation is exemplary, the unilateral approach of 
Australia deserves special attention and recognition. Section 155AAA of the Australian 
Competition and Consumer Act 2010, appears one of the most (if not the most) liberal 
legal frameworks worldwide governing evidence sharing. The ACCC can share 
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confidential information, both provided to the ACCC in confidence or gathered by the 
authority itself, with ‘a foreign government body’ to assist it in its performance or 
execution of its functions.140 The notion of the foreign government body is defined 
broadly and it includes competition authorities irrespective of their character 
(administrative v. law enforcement agency) or their reach (regional, national, 
supranational).141 Since provisions of Section 155AAA do not require reciprocity as a 
precondition for disclosure, the ACCC may share confidential information with antitrust 
agencies which would not be able to offer comparable assistance. This type of national 
provisions allowing competition agency to share confidential information—without the 
consent of the source—with foreign counterparts are often called “information 
gateways”.142 
Upon a formal request from a foreign body it is up to the ACCC Chairman whether 
to disclose the information.143 The Chairman may ‘impose conditions to be complied 
with in relation to protected information disclosed’.144 While the Section 155AAA itself 
does not list factors which should be considered, regard may be given to:145 
(1) Australia's relations with other countries; (2) the need to avoid disruption to national 
and international law enforcement efforts; (3) the interests of the administration of 
justice; (4) the ACCC’s policies, including its leniency programme; and (5) the effect 
that disclosure could have on the safety of an informant, as well as the fact that 
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disclosure may discourage informants from providing information in the future. The 
later factor is reinforced in the ACCC’s immunity policy.146 Except as required by law, 
ACCC will not share confidential information without informant’s consent. 
Australian authorities consider that sharing confidential information in assistance to 
foreign investigations ‘benefits Australia as the effects of a cartel can often extend 
beyond a single country’s borders.’147 From this perspective Australia stands out as an 
example of a jurisdiction which not only managed to address concerns relating to 
confidential information sharing, but went beyond the limits of traditional public 
international law approach to international commitments by creating a framework 
allowing the ACCC to assist foreign counterparts in their investigations irrespective of 
whether they would be able to reciprocate. 
Without getting involved in bilateral or plurilateral negotiations, Australia introduced 
a regime—an information gateway—which allows the ACCC to share confidential 
information with counterparts, on a case-by-case basis. This is a model solution. 
Australia-based entities considering anticompetitive strategies have good reasons to be 
alarmed. If the Australian example is followed, the international community could 
experience a radical improvement in the fight against transnational anticompetitive 
conduct (especially in cases where there is an international consensus as to the harmful 
nature of the conduct at stake).148  
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Assisting foreign counterparts may of course absorb agency’s scarce resources. This 
need not be a predicament to cooperation. There is no reason why the requesting agency 
should not be asked to cover the costs of assistance incurred by the requested 
authority.149 The recent New Zealand’s legislation explicitly empowers the NZCC to 
request foreign counterparts to cover such costs.150 
IV.  CONCLUSIONS 
Despite increasingly transnational nature of commerce, competition laws remain 
predominantly national. Enforces often have to pursue foreign violators. In such 
transnational cases access to foreign-based evidence poses a great, frequently 
insurmountable, practical challenge. Most competition authorities are not empowered to 
share confidential information/ evidence with foreign counterparts, or assist them in that 
regard. 
Various concerns are being voiced against such close inter-agency cooperation. As 
discussed, some of them are valid. Yet, none rule out confidential information sharing 
as such. This paper argued that necessary and appropriate safeguards can be introduced 
to accommodate legitimate worries. In some cases cooperation may not be possible, for 
example, due to important state interests involved. Given the harmful nature of 
anticompetitive conduct, such cases are an exception, not the rule. 
Some states entered into international agreements allowing for inter-agency 
evidence/ confidential information sharing. These are welcomed developments, yet—as 
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discussed—the scope of this phenomenon from a global perspective is limited. In most 
cases when the special regime explicitly allowing for disclosure has not been 
introduced, domestic laws governing confidentiality block any exchanges of 
confidential materials between the cooperation-oriented agencies.  
Further efforts should be invested in building trust between competition law 
enforcers and further development of inter-agency enforcement cooperation. The 
Australian example, in particular, shows that suitable changes, allowing for close 
cooperation with foreign counterparts, can be introduced unilaterally. This model 
solution should be learnt from. Such a bottom-up change would be most welcomed. It 
would allow different states to adopt their own strategies, perhaps gradual, regarding 
information and evidence sharing. It could also create a political pressure for a 
change—a form of soft coercion—in these jurisdictions which are particularly 
concerned about confidential information sharing arrangements. If such approach is 
followed, the international community may experience a radical improvement in the 
fight against transnational anticompetitive conduct for the ultimate benefits of 
consumers. Since consumers in democratic countries cast votes, politicians should not 
easily disregard this opportunity. 
 
